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Abstract: Over the years, the digitization of all aspects of life in modern societies is considered an
acquired advantage. However, like the terrestrial world, the digital world is not perfect and many
dangers and threats are present. In the present work, we conduct a systematic review on the methods
of network detection and cyber attacks that can take place in a critical infrastructure. As is shown,
the implementation of a system that learns from the system behavior (machine learning), on multiple
levels and spots any diversity, is one of the most effective solutions.
Keywords: critical infrastructures; intrusion detection systems; digitization
1. Introduction
Nowadays, the tremendous development of technology has resulted in the permeation
of it in all sectors of industries and infrastructures. This phenomenon is inevitable because
modern societies have increased demands of resources to function properly [1]. Due to the
extensive use of technology, production can be increased and society’s demands handled
[2]. These infrastructures are called critical infrastructures due to the significant roles that
they play. However, the adoption of technologies in the function of critical infrastructures
allows several attacks to exploit the vulnerabilities of the critical infrastructures [3]. The
scientific community tries to detect the vulnerabilities, possible threats, and attacks in
critical infrastructures to develop security systems that prevent those attacks. One of the
most well-known and commonly applied types of attack is the intrusion attack.
Today, countries have to support the increased resources that societies need to re-
main functional and protect their economies from crises. For this reason, countries rely
on infrastructures (assets, industries, and systems) to handle and provide the required
resources such as energy, communications, transportation, etc. We characterize as critical
infrastructures the group of infrastructures that handle important resources such as power
grids, water treatment plants, health services, and any other service which relates to the
maintenance of the national economy, health, and security. The most crucial of the critical
infrastructures are energy, water, transportation, and communications [4] since these infras-
tructures handle resources for the majority of operations of modern societies. Moreover, all
critical infrastructures are interconnected and interdependent between them and with the
sectors of the economy. This strong association between the critical infrastructure sectors
means that damage in one service of a sector or even worse the loss of one sector will
undoubtedly affect, to the same or a greater degree, the other critical infrastructures.
The large necessity of countries to satisfy the aforementioned requirements caused
a rapid inflow of technology in the critical infrastructures to control their operations and
maximize their performances. However, these computer systems have vulnerabilities and
there are threats to their security. The high rate of cyber attacks in critical infrastructures
such as the well-known Stuxnet malware, whose goal was to damage a nuclear power
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plant in Iran [5], confirms the necessity to develop algorithms, techniques, and software to
counteract such attacks.
This research focuses on intrusion detection in critical infrastructures. More specif-
ically, we refer to some of the most common attacks that can be used by the attacker to
take the control of a system or cause damage to it. Furthermore, this research contains a
description of techniques and models which have been implemented in several intrusion
detection systems. The contributions and novelty of the article are:
• We present some of the most used and well-known attacks which could harm a critical
infrastructure and cause serious problems and damages;
• We present a short analysis of machine learning and deep learning models and
methods which are used in intrusion detection systems, as shown in the literature;
• We conduct several experiments by generating DoS (Denial of Service Attacks) attacks
in order to measure packet loss and response delay;
• We evaluate the efficiency of several machine learning techniques against several
attacks by using a publicly available dataset;
• We discuss our findings and propose several future research directions.
The rest of this research is organized as follows: In Section 2, we present the related
work with critical infrastructures’ vulnerabilities and threats, types of attacks, e.g., phishing,
SQL injection, etc. Section 3 presents some of the most used intrusion attack methods along
with the proposed IDS models from the literature that use either machine or deep learning.
In Section 4, we evaluate common DOS attacks using our experimental small network
section and we also present the accuracy of common ML techniques against a dataset that
includes a wide variety of intrusions simulated in a military network environment. Finally,
Section 5.2 includes the conclusions that we draw from this research.
2. Related Work
Critical infrastructures are a significant sector of every country and, for this reason, it
is crucial to know which are the threats and vulnerabilities in such systems and possible
attacks in order to find a way to prevent and confront them. The research effort presented
in [6] gives emphasis on the recent SCADA systems vulnerabilities and recommends
ways for the improvement of the security in crucial components of SCADA systems in
industrial infrastructures. Additionally, the authors of [7] present the main threats in critical
infrastructures, security measures for these threats, and an overview of the categories of
cyberattack techniques. In [8], the vulnerabilities and the threats in critical infrastructures
are presented, and possible solutions are recommended. In [9], the authors present a review
of the existing sniffing attacks, variations of these attacks, and prevention and detection
techniques. Moreover, in [10], the authors presented a review of SQL injection attacks.
The next paper introduces a survey of phishing attacks [11]. The research article in [12]
investigates brute force attacks which aim to find the configurations of an IoT network.
The development of several types of systems to ensure the security of critical infrastruc-
tures is the result of the need to deal with the threats and attacks in critical infrastructures
such as nuclear power plants [13]. Scholars have proposed a number of technical measures
that include technological tools to prevent [14,15], defend [16], detect [17], mitigate [18],
and respond to cyber attacks. One way to check if a system is being attacked or an intruder
has gained access to it is to detect abnormal behavior. The authors of [19] present the
similarities, differences, and limitations of the most used tools for fault diagnosis and
cybersecurity. In [20], the authors present a real-time anomaly-based Intrusion Detection
System (IDS), which has the goal to detect attacks in industrial process levels of critical
infrastructures. In [21], the authors present a survey of data mining techniques adopted
to detect anomalies in data or reveal if a system attacked. The authors of [22] introduce a
new method for intrusion detection that relies on an incremental clustering algorithm and
adopts the DBSCAN algorithm. The authors of [23] propose a new algorithm for attack
detection based on an autoencoder. In [24], the authors present a new algorithm to prevent
users from phishing. Again, the DBSCAN algorithm is adopted, but in combination with a
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technique named RD-TIA [25], which clusters the data based on their features as phishing
or legitimate, in an effort to increase the accuracy of the algorithm. An extended version of
an isolation forest was introduced by the authors of [26] for fault detection in hydroelectric
plants. Furthermore, in [27], a deep learning approach using a Long Short Term Memory
(LSTM) architecture and Recurrent Neural Network (RNN) aims to create an intrusion
detection system. Additionally, [28] studies the comparison between the naïve Bayes
classifier and hidden Markov model. Both models are applied to detect spam emails. In
[29], a detailed analysis is presented for seven deep learning models such as Convolutional
Neural Networks (CNNs), recurrent neural networks, etc., and their performances for
intrusion detection are tested. The authors of [30] evaluate some of the most well-known
machine learning models for intrusion detection. Finally, the research [31] presents an
evaluation of the performance of restricted Boltzmann machines when they were applied
to detect intruders in an anomalous network intrusion detection system.
3. Intrusion Attack Methods
Critical infrastructures, as mentioned before, have a crucial role in the functioning of
society. Hence, countries try to improve their efficiency and at the same time reduce the
time and production cost. However, some of the improvements that the countries apply
to achieve this goal have created vulnerabilities in critical infrastructure systems. Hence,
these vulnerabilities allow attackers to overcome the security of those systems and gain
access to systems with privileges that are not permitted to have. Below, we give a short
description of intrusion attack methods.
Brute-force attack: This is one of the most well-known attacks. The operation of this
attack type is simple and relies on the computing power of the attacker’s computer system.
Specifically, the attacker tries to find the correct combination of username and password
using an exhaustive search of passwords and usernames. Usually, these attacks use tools to
find the proper letters and symbols that constitute the password and the username. An
attack that belongs to this category is a Dictionary attack which tries to find the correct
username and password searching through a dictionary with common words and phrases
that could be the password or username.
Buffer overload: This kind of attack has as goal to overwrite the data that exists in
memory to gain control of the system. More specifically, the attacker gives as input to a
program—more data than the buffer can handle. As a result, the data overcome the buffer
boundary and the additional data stored in adjacent memory locations. The attackers
use this attack in order to cause a Denial of Service (DoS) situation or in cases where the
memory is well-defined can find the part of memory where the executable code of the
system is stored and replace it with their own executable code. In the second case, the
attacker can take the control of the system and intervene in the program operation.
Phishing: Phishing is a fraud type attack [32] that tries to delude the users by im-
personating someone else, e.g., a company, which the user (victim) trusts. Often in these
attacks, the attackers send an email that seems to be legitimate but it is not. The email
that the user receives contains a malware file or insecure link. Hence, the attacker hopes
the user (victim) will open the attachment file or link and the malware will be installed
on the victim’s computer. The previous process has the result that the attacker has access
to sensitive data such as passwords, usernames, etc. Some of the most common types of
phishing listed below are referred to in [33]:
• Clone phishing;
• Spear phishing;
• Social networking on mobile;
• Gaming phishing;
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SQL injection: In this type of intrusion attack, the attacker sets an SQL statement as
an input in the application’s input box in order to gain access to the database. The success
of the attack results in the intruder gaining the permission to execute malicious code and
harm the database or, even worse, retrieve sensitive data. The risks associated with SQL
injection attacks and classification of SQL injection attack types are presented in detail.
Sniffer attack: Frequently, applications transmit packages over the transmission
channel to exchange information with each other. A Sniffer attack is a process where the
attacker captures, decodes, inspects and interprets the data in these packages. The context
of these packages is usually passwords, usernames, etc.—i.e., important data. There are
two types of Sniffer attacks, active and passive. In an active Sniffer attack, the attacker
interacts with network traffic and the victim can detect if someone spies him and steal
packages. On the other hand, in a passive Sniffer attack the victim does not has the ability
to realize if someone performs a Sniffer attack because the attacker does not interact with
network traffic.
Trojan horses: Trojan horses are programs that contain the attacker’s malware file in
order to camouflage the malware from the victim’s systems defenses. In particular, the
attackers use these programs attached to an email or in free downloaded files and programs
to insert their malicious code in the victim’s computer or to performs any other attack
they want. Frequently, trojan horses are used by attackers as backdoors to gain access to
a system.
4. Intrusion Detection Systems
Models and algorithms in intrusion detection systems: In this chapter, we present
some of the most well-known algorithms and models which can be applied into an imple-
mentation of an intrusion detection system (IDS), since the existence of anomalies in data
may denote that an intruder has access to our computer system. The models presented
below belong to the areas of machine and deep learning.
4.1. Machine Learning Models
K-Means: K-Means is one of the most popular and used unsupervised algorithms.
This algorithm tries to minimize the distance of points in a cluster with their centers. The
K-Means takes as input a dataset of n data points, i.e., D = d0, d1, . . . , dn and the number
of clusters (K) that we want to cluster the data need to be predefined. The steps of the
K-Means algorithm are enumerated as follow:
• From the dataset, D are randomly chosen K data points to be the centers of the K
clusters;
• Every data point in D are assigned in the cluster whose centers is nearest to the
examined data point;
• After the completion of step 2, we recalculate the center of each cluster only based on
the data point which belongs to the cluster;
• When the new cluster’s centers are the same as the cluster’s centers of previous
iteration, the algorithm output the clusters. Otherwise, we iterate from step 2.
The K-Means algorithm is a simple and efficient method for intrusion detection
systems because it has the ability to cluster and classify tremendous volumes of high-
dimensional numerical data.
Naive Bayes classifier: The naive Bayes classifier is based on Bayes’ theorem. The
algorithm uses the Bayes theorem which has the ability to calculate the probability of an
event occurring when we know the probability of another event that has already occurred.
This probability can be calculated using the formula P(c|x) = (P(x |c) ∗ P(c))/(P(x)).
In the above equation, P(c|x) is the probability of the target class (C) given predictor
(x, attributes), P(C) is the prior probability of target class (C), P(x|c) is the likelihood
which is the probability of the predictor given class and P(x) is the prior probability of the
predictor. More specifically, the posterior probability is calculated constructing a frequency
table for each attribute against the target class. Then, the frequency tables are transformed
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to likelihood tables and used in combination with Equation 1 to calculate the posterior
probability for each class. The class with the highest posterior probability is the outcome of
prediction. The goal is to predict the correct class for a new instance.
K-nearest neighbors classifier: This algorithm is based on distance/similarity be-
tween two data. Specifically, the algorithm classifies a given data x using the following
steps: (i) calculate the distance/similarity to all the data based on a function; (ii) sort the
outcome of the function in ascending order; (iii) select the top K data of the ascending
order; (iv) classify the given data x in the majority class of the top k nearest data. The most
common approach of KNN uses the Euclidean distance between the data to detect the top
K nearest neighbors.
DBSCAN: The DBSCAN (Density-Based Spatial Clustering of Applications with
Noise) is one of the most widely used algorithms for performing clustering. DBSCAN
processes the data based on the density that they have and for this reason it belongs in
the category of density-based algorithms. The goal of DBSCAN is to assign the examined
data points to subsets, i.e., clusters, and detect possible anomalies in the dataset. Assume
a set of n points P = p0, p1, . . . , p(n− 1) and each data point pi,i ε [0,n) belongs to some
d-dimensional space R ∧ d with d ε N. Hence, the DBSCAN, in order to cluster the points
that belong in P, uses two parameters: The first is ε, which is the radius of the neighborhood
around a data point (calculated by a distance metric) that determines the data points that
are very close to a data point under consideration. The second parameter is the minimum
number of points minPts that pi has to be connected in its neighborhood to be characterized
as a core point.
Decision trees: Decision trees are used for classification processes. A decision tree is
designed upside down with the root at the top. It consists of the root node, the interval
nodes, and leaves, and all these components are connected with branches. The root node is
the beginning of the tree, each interval node represents an attribute/feature, and every leaf
represents a class in which the data will be classified. The general step for the creation of a
decision tree can be summarized in the following steps: (i) beginning from the root node,
which contains the complete dataset, we defined as D; (ii) find the best attribute/feature in
the dataset based on an Attribute Selection Measure (ASM); (iii) divide the D into subsets
that contain possible values for the best attributes/features; (iv) construct the internal node,
which contains the best attribute; (v) the algorithm repeats steps three and four recursively
to construct new internal nodes using each time the subsets were created from the third
step. The algorithm stops when it cannot further classify the data, abd the last node is the
leaf node which contains the classes of the data. The paper [34] contains an anomaly-based
intrusion detection system using a CART decision tree.
SVM: Support vector machine is a supervised machine learning classification algo-
rithm which is usually used in IDS systems. SVM is mostly used for binary classification
problems and has as goal to find the appropriate hyperplane to maximize the distance
between two classes. A hyperplane is a threshold which separates the data into two classes
in the best way. In a two-dimensional space, we can image the hyperplane as a line which
separates the data into two groups/classes. Hence, SVM makes sure to select the appro-
priate hyperplane. The data points which are closest to the hyperplane are called support
vectors. SVM is used in both linear separable cases and linear non-separable cases. In linear
separable cases, SVM plots the data in a n-dimensional space where each feature of data
corresponds to one dimension and tries to find the hyperplane that maximizes the distance
between the two classes. On the other hand, in linear non-separable cases, SVM introduces
two concepts: soft margin and kernel tricks. SVM uses the soft margin approach in an
effort to balance the trade-off between the maximization of distance between the classes
and the misclassification. Alternatively, SVM adopts kernel trick, where the kernel maps
the data into a new higher-dimensional space so that the original non-linear data can be
separated.
Isolation forest: This algorithm is used to identify the anomaly data creating decision
trees over random attributes. The idea behind the algorithm is that if a forest of random
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decision trees produces shorter path lengths for some points, then these points are highly
likely to be anomalies. The algorithm starts with the training phase, i.e., the construction of
the isolation trees. In the first step, a subset of training dataset is selected. The second step
of the construction is to randomly choose an attribute r and a random value of this attribute
between its min and max values; this value is called the split value. In the third step, a data
point is selected and if it has a value smaller than the "split value" for the attribute r, then
that point is sent to the left branch. Otherwise, the point is sent to the right branch. The
second and the third steps are repeated recursively over the subset until a complete data
point isolation, or a predetermined tree depth limit is reached. After the training phase is
completed, the testing phase begins. In this phase, every examined data x has to pass over
all isolation trees to obtain its path length h(x). The anomaly score for the x is calculated as
follows:
s(x, n) = 2−E(h(x))/c(n) (1)
where
E(h(x)) = Σti=1hi(x)/t (2)
is the average path length of x over t isolation trees and c(n) is the average path length of
unsuccessful search in Binary Search Tree.
c(n) = 2H(n− 1)− (2(n− 1)/n)
with
H(i) = ln(i) + γ
where γ is the Euler’s constant. Generally, if the score is close to 1, then the examined data
point is considered as an anomaly. Otherwise, if the anomaly score is smaller than 0.5, it is
considered as a normal datum.
4.2. Deep Learning Models
Autoencoders: Autoencoders belong to unsupervised learning algorithms. An au-
toencoder in its simplest form consists of three components, an encoder, code, and decoder.
An encoder is a feed-forward, fully connected neural network which has a goal to com-
press the input data vector into a latent space representation and encode it in a reduced
dimension. The code contains the reduced data vector and sets it as input to the decoder.
The decoder has the same structure but inversed, i.e., the first layer of the decoder has the
same size as the last layer of the decoder. The operation of an autoencoder starts with the
transformation of the input data vector into lower dimensions (encoder). The output of the
encoder is stored in the code. After that, the autoencoder tries to reconstruct the initial input
from the compressed data vector (decoder). There are many types of autoencoders. There
are many types of autoencoders. Below we refer to some of the most used autoencoders
types: convolutional autoencoders, variational autoencoders, denoising autoencoders and
deep autoencoders.
RNN: Recurrent neural networks (RNNs) are a type of artificial neural network used
in cases of processing sequential and time-series data. RNNs take as input a sequence
of data and, from them, produce a sequence of outputs. The difference between the
classical neural networks and the RNNs is depicted with the presence of a ”hidden” state
vector which represents the context based on prior input(s)/output(s). This means that the
output depends on two parameters; the current input and the sequence of previous inputs.
A simple implementation of RNN can be mathematically formulated by the following
equations:
ht = σ(h)(W(h)ht−1 + W(x)xt) (3)
yt = σ(y)(W(y)ht) (4)
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In these equations, xt represents the input for the current timestamp t, ht and ht−1
represent the hidden state vector for the current and previous timestamps, respectively.
Additionally, the dense matrices are defined by W(h), W(x), W(y) and the activation func-
tions are represented by σ(h), σ(y). One important characteristic is that the RNNs have the
same weight parameter within each layer of the network in contrast with traditional neural
networks.
LSTM: Long short-term memory networks are a type of recurrent neural network
(RNN) which have the ability to overcome the long-term dependency issue of recurrent
networks. Many times, information from previous timestamps have important effects on
the output of a model. Due to the ability of LSTMs to remember information for long
time, LSTMs are a common choice for time-series models. A classical LSTM consists of
four neural network layers. Each LSTM module contains a forget gate, an input gate, an
output gate and a cell state. The basic component is the cell state which passes through the
repeating modules. The forget gate decides how much of the memory from the previous
module should be maintained. The input gate takes into consideration the input at current
timestamp, the output of the previous output and combines them with an output activation
function. The output gate decides based on the information from the input at current
timestamp, the previous output and an output activation function the new output.
1D convolutional neural networks (CNN): CNNs are a deep learning model of
feed-forward neural-networks. The most common version of CNNs is 2D CNNs which
are applied in image processing. However, in intrusion detection systems they can be
more effective than 1D CNNs due to the way they process the data. More specifically,
2D CNNs kernel move horizontally across the data whereas 1D CNNs move vertically.
The architecture of CNNs contains two types of layers CNN-layers and MLP-layers. In
CNN layers, the 1D convolutions and sub-sampling functions are applied. The list of
hyper-parameters below forms the configuration of a 1D CNN.
• Number of hidden CNN and MLP layers;
• Kernel size in each CNN layer;
• Subsampling factor in each CNN layer;
• The chosen pooling and activation functions.
The paper [35] include a survey in 1D convolutional neural networks and present the
applications in which they can be applied.
5. Evaluation of Attacks and Detection Mechanisms
The purpose of our section is to generate DoS (Denial of Service) attacks as well as
deploy countermeasures against them. Both the attacks and their results will be presented
in detail along with some detection mechanisms.
5.1. Attacks
Denial of service attacks aim to deny machine or network resources to certain users
by interrupting the services of the host that are connected to the Internet. Such attacks are
usually carried out by flooding a machine with unnecessary requests, overloading it, thus
preventing the fulfillment of real requests. The scripts are located in Github Source Code (
https://github.com/DeStC3/DosAttacksAndCountermeasures, accessed on 25/08/2021).
DDoS attacks are similar, except that incoming requests to the victim now come
from multiple sources (distributed), making DDoS attacks more efficient, as it is almost
impossible to block all target destinations of the attack.
All of these attacks are usually a derivative of some specialized tools available on
many Linux operating systems, or programming language packs that take advantage of the
basic principles of network structures and their principles used in an OS to easily generate
scripts/attacks. In the simplest variations of these, the technique is usually to send a large
volume of packets to the target, while in more complex ones, botnets or tools such as
MyDoom or Slowloris can be used, along with sending packets of various protocols.
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UDP Flood: A UDP Flood attack floods the target with a large number of User Data-
gram (Protocol) protocol packages. The general goal is to find random ports of the system,
with the result that it repeatedly tries to check the application listening to this port; when
none is found, then it sends back, in response, an ICMP package with the information
“Destination Unreachable”. Obviously in large volumes, network resources start to run out
of downloads and send, possibly leading to denial of access. Our version of a UDP Flood
follows this simple standard, creating a udp packet and then sending it to the target for a
specific period of time. Here, we assume that we already know the IP of the target as well
as which ports are open in its system.
SYN Flood: SYN Flood exploits a known vulnerability in the TCP connection sequence,
the three way handshake, where a SYN request to start a TCP connection must receive an
SYN-ACK response from the host and then send back an ACK response. In such an attack,
the request sender sends many SYN requests, but either does not respond to SYN-ACK
with its own ACK, or sends requests from fake IPs. In any case, the host system waits for
the response to each request, freezing resources until it can not create new connections,
leading to denial of service.
To create our own attack, we used Python’s scapy package, which is widely used in
such cases. Initially, fake IPs are created for a number of packets, as well as TCP packets
that are sent. Due to problems using the scapy classes, the addresses and packet data were
based on the template, but were inserted directly into the shipment function as it was the
only suggested solution that bypassed the object creation problem.
ICMP Attack: Similar to UDP attacks, ICMPs send a large number of echo requests
without expecting a response. They are able to consume incoming and outgoing bandwidth,
as the system is forced to constantly send back reply packets, delaying it considerably. Our
ICMP attack module creates and sends packets, the number of which is user-defined and
determines the duration of the attack at a rate of about 10 to 1 (10 packs per second).
Ping of Death: An attack of this type typically involves sending malicious or malicious
pings to a computer. The maximum size of an IP packet is about 64 bytes, including the
header. However, the data link layer sets some upper limits on size, usually the maximum
frame size. So, sometimes a large package is split into smaller fragments when sent, while
the recipient reassembles them into a whole, which can create a buffer overflow on the
memory pieces assigned to the package by creating denial of service for regular data
packets. and allowing malware to be installed. For this attack, which runs on a number of
packets, a false IP address is created each time it is used to create the packet before it is sent
to the recipient.
5.2. Evaluation Results
The attacks were carried out on two machines which are in the same network, con-
nected to two different router devices. For convenience, the target machine has its firewall
turned off while the only processes running in the background are those that monitor
the system network devices (nload, netstat, tcpdump) and the process that measures the
device network response (ping in the address google.com). At the same time, the fact that
the router/modem devices that provide the internet connection have their own firewalls
that are locked to the active one by the provider must be taken into account. When the
system is in a healthy state, the response time for the ping google.com command is 68–69
ms depending on the execution time with no data loss.
The results of the attacks vary, depending on the type of each (see Figures 1 and 2).
The Ping of Death and SYN Flood attacks proved to be stronger, with the former creating a
very large percentage of packet loss (80%), which makes sense considering its model as well
as the size of the packages shipped, while SYN creates the longer network response delays
(up to 500 ms) due to the commitment of network resources to validate the handshake for
each TCP packet.
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Figure 1. Packet loss during attacks.
The UDP and ICMP attacks proved to be less effective, a phenomenon based on
the simplistic model they follow. Of course, the ICMP attack crisis must also be based
on the settings of the target machine. A conventional machine (PC) has very few ports
listening to the ICMP protocol and more TCP/UDP so most packets do not reach the target
effectively. Of course, if the target was a configured mail-server, obviously the configured
ports listening in the mail protocol would be higher in number and the attack would be
more efficient.
Figure 2. Response delay during attacks.
5.3. Intrusion Detection Systems
Finally, we decided to test several ML methods against several attacks since usually
the implementation of an IDS system follows a more dynamic approach using different
machine learning models. By choosing a dataset that contains a number of malicious and
normal connections to a network, we can train a system so that by inputting a link with
the same number of arguments as the dataset, it can decide and inform the administrator
of a network for malicious connections and packets. We decided to implement an IDS
which will use machine learning to detect suspicious links and test it on the KDD CUP
1999 Dataset (http://kdd.ics.uci.edu/databases/kddcup99/kddcup99.html, accessed on
25/08/2021) We used several algorithms (Gaussian naïve Bayes, decision tree, random
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forest, support vector classifier, logistic regression, gradient descent) and the findings are
shown in Figure 3.
Figure 3. Detection accuracy.
6. Conclusions—Discussion
Over recent years, the need for shielding critical infrastructure has become more and
more and more urgent. The security of the product or service produced, through one
almost completely automated process, and the elimination of labor opportunity accidents
caused by cyber attacks and at the same time their full cooperation with automations
and automated processes that take place during the production process perform timely
and valid detections of cyber attacks on and cyber intrusion into a critical infrastructure,
which is a rather difficult achievement. The most modern studies discuss the application of
intelligent algorithms using artificial intelligence (AI), which will be modeled on a set of
rules set out in by the managers or the system itself and will evolve through productive
processes using machine learning (ML). To date, it has not been established whether theory
can meet practice in real conditions of an infrastructure that manages vital products or
services and whether, during the production process, different suppliers of devices, as well
as sensors of low technical specifications and computing power, are used.
In this research, we investigated intrusion detection in critical infrastructures. In-
trusion detection systems are the first line of defense against intrusion attacks. More
specifically, we referred to the definition of critical infrastructures and the significant role
that they have for a country. Additionally, we mentioned some of the most used and
well-known attacks which could harm a critical infrastructure and cause serious problems
and damages to it and by extension to the sectors of a country such as the economy, etc.
Furthermore, we present a short analysis of machine learning and deep learning models
and methods which are used in intrusion detection systems, as shown in the literature.
We comprehended the important role of the security of critical infrastructures from cyber
attacks and other threats. However there are many challenges in the security of critical in-
frastructure and generally in cybersecurity. A significant part of the implemented solutions
does not focus on unsolved important problems, such as the development of lightweight
intrusion detection systems that are able to work in devices with limited power supply,
false alarm control, the reduction in false positives and false negatives number and DoS
attacks. Moreover, dynamic IDSs that can cope with altering conditions of the system must
be further examined and analyzed [36]. Another important future direction in intrusion
detection systems is the application of deep learning approaches in combination with a
proper dataset to produce valid results.
Smart Cities 2021, 1 11
Author Contributions: Conceptualization, F.P., K.T. and L.M.; methodology, K.T., K.G. and L.M.;
software, K.T., K.G. and M.A.F.; validation, M.A.F. and L.M.; formal analysis, P.F., M.A.F. and M.L.;
investigation, K.T., K.G., P.F. and M.A.F.; resources, K.T., K.G. and L.M.; data curation, KG., K.T., P.F.
and M.A.F.; writing—original draft preparation, K.T., K.G. and P.F.; writing—review and editing,
M.A.F. and L.M.; visualization, M.A.F. and L.M.; supervision, M.A.F. and L.M. All authors have read
and agreed to the published version of the manuscript.
Funding: This research received no external funding.
Institutional Review Board Statement: Not applicable.
Informed Consent Statement: Not applicable.
Data Availability Statement: The scripts are located on Github Source Code (https://github.com/
DeStC3/DosAttacksAndCountermeasures, accessed on25/08/2021). Additional data that are pre-
sented in this study are available on request from the corresponding author.
Conflicts of Interest: All authors declare no conflict of interest.
References
1. Çimen, H.; Palacios-García, E.J.; Kolaek, M.; Çetinkaya, N.; Vasquez, J.C.; Guerrero, J.M. Smart-Building Applications: Deep
Learning-Based, Real-Time Load Monitoring. IEEE Ind. Electron. Mag. 2020, 15, 4–15.
2. Santiago, I.; Moreno-Munoz, A.; Quintero-Jiménez, P.; Garcia-Torres, F.; Gonzalez-Redondo, M. Electricity demand during
pandemic times: The case of the COVID-19 in Spain. Energy Policy 2021, 148, 111964.
3. Coffey, K.; Maglaras, L.A.; Smith, R.; Janicke, H.; Ferrag, M.A.; Derhab, A.; Mukherjee, M.; Rallis, S.; Yousaf, A. Vulnerability
assessment of cyber security for SCADA systems. In Guide to Vulnerability Analysis for Computer Networks and Systems; Springer:
Berlin/Heidelberg, Germany, 2018; pp. 59–80.
4. Lewis, T.G. Critical Infrastructure Protection in Homeland Security: Defending a Networked Nation; John Wiley & Sons: Hoboken, NJ,
USA, 2019.
5. Kushner, D. The real story of stuxnet. IEEE Spectr. 2013, 50, 48–53.
6. Upadhyay, D.; Sampalli, S. SCADA (Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition) systems: Vulnerability assessment and security
recommendations. Comput. Secur. 2020, 89, 101666.
7. Maglaras, L.; Ferrag, M.; Derhab, A.; Mukherjee, M.; Janicke, H.; Rallis, S. Threats, countermeasures and attribution of cyber
attacks on critical infrastructures. EAI Endorsed Trans. Secur. Saf. 2018, 5, e1.
8. Robles, R.J.; Choi, M.k.; Cho, E.s.; Kim, S.s.; Park, G.C.; Lee, J. Common threats and vulnerabilities of critical infrastructures. Int.
J. Control Autom. 2008, 1, 17–22.
9. Prabadevi, B.; Jeyanthi, N. A review on various sniffing attacks and its mitigation techniques. Indones. J. Electr. Eng. Comput. Sci
2018, 12, 1117–1125.
10. Halfond, W.G.; Viegas, J.; Orso, A.; others. A classification of SQL-injection attacks and countermeasures. In Proceedings of the
IEEE International Symposium on Secure Software Engineering, Raleigh, NC, USA, 7–10 November 2006; Volume 1, pp. 13–15.
11. Alabdan, R. Phishing attacks survey: types, vectors, and technical approaches. Future Internet 2020, 12, 168.
12. Stiawan, D.; Idris, M.; Malik, R.F.; Nurmaini, S.; Alsharif, N.; Budiarto, R.; others. Investigating brute force attack patterns in IoT
network. J. Electr. Comput. Eng. 2019, 2019.
13. Tewari, A.; Gupta, B.B. Security, privacy and trust of different layers in Internet-of-Things (IoTs) framework. Future Gener.
Comput. Syst. 2020, 108, 909–920.
14. Ferrag, M.A.; Maglaras, L.; Derhab, A.; Janicke, H. Authentication schemes for smart mobile devices: Threat models, countermea-
sures, and open research issues. Telecommun. Syst. 2020, 73, 317–348.
15. Wen, H.; Tang, J.; Wu, J.; Song, H.; Wu, T.; Wu, B.; Ho, P.H.; Lv, S.C.; Sun, L.M. A cross-layer secure communication model based
on Discrete Fractional Fourier Fransform (DFRFT). IEEE Trans. Emerg. Top. Comput. 2014, 3, 119–126.
16. Mishra, A.; Gupta, N.; Gupta, B. Defense mechanisms against DDoS attack based on entropy in SDN-cloud using POX controller.
Telecommun. Syst. 2021, 77, 47–62.
17. Hamedani, K.; Liu, L.; Atat, R.; Wu, J.; Yi, Y. Reservoir computing meets smart grids: Attack detection using delayed feedback
networks. IEEE Trans. Ind. Inform. 2017, 14, 734–743.
18. Bhushan, K.; Gupta, B.B. Distributed denial of service (DDoS) attack mitigation in software defined network (SDN)-based cloud
computing environment. J. Ambient. Intell. Humaniz. Comput. 2019, 10, 1985–1997.
19. Ayodeji, A.; Liu, Y.k.; Chao, N.; Yang, L.q. A new perspective towards the development of robust data-driven intrusion detection
for industrial control systems. Nucl. Eng. Technol. 2020, 52, 2687–2698.
20. Clotet, X.; Moyano, J.; León, G. A real-time anomaly-based IDS for cyber-attack detection at the industrial process level of critical
infrastructures. Int. J. Crit. Infrastruct. Prot. 2018, 23, 11–20.
21. Agrawal, S.; Agrawal, J. Survey on anomaly detection using data mining techniques. Procedia Comput. Sci. 2015, 60, 708–713.
Smart Cities 2021, 1 12
22. Oh, S.H.; Lee, W.S. Anomaly intrusion detection based on dynamic cluster updating. In Proceedings of the Pacific-Asia
Conference on Knowledge Discovery and Data Mining, Nanjing, China, 22–25 May 2007; Springer: Berlin/Heidelberg, Germany,
2007; pp. 737–744.
23. Bae, G.; Jang, S.; Kim, M.; Joe, I. Autoencoder-based on anomaly detection with intrusion scoring for smart factory environments.
In Proceedings of the International Conference on Parallel and Distributed Computing: Applications and Technologies, Jeju
Island, South Korea, 20–22 August 2018; Springer: Berlin/Heidelberg, Germany, 2018; pp. 414–423.
24. Jeong, S.Y.; Koh, Y.S.; Dobbie, G. Phishing detection on Twitter streams. In Proceedings of the Pacific-Asia Conference on
Knowledge Discovery and Data Mining, Auckland, New Zealand, 19–22 April 2016; Springer: Berlin/Heidelberg, Germany, 2016;
pp. 141–153.
25. Zhou, W.; Wen, J.; Koh, Y.S.; Alam, S.; Dobbie, G. Attack detection in recommender systems based on target item analysis. In
Proceedings of the 2014 International Joint Conference on Neural Networks (IJCNN), Beijing, China, 6–11 July 2014; pp. 332–339.
26. de Santis, R.B.; Costa, M.A. Extended Isolation Forests for Fault Detection in Small Hydroelectric Plants. Sustainability 2020,
12, 6421.
27. Kim, J.; Kim, J.; Thu, H.L.T.; Kim, H. Long short term memory recurrent neural network classifier for intrusion detection. In
Proceedings of the 2016 International Conference on Platform Technology and Service (PlatCon), Jeju, Korea, 15–17 February
2016; pp. 1–5.
28. Gomes, S.R.; Saroar, S.G.; Mosfaiul, M.; Telot, A.; Khan, B.N.; Chakrabarty, A.; Mostakim, M. A comparative approach to email
classification using Naive Bayes classifier and hidden Markov model. In Proceedings of the 2017 4th International Conference on
Advances in Electrical Engineering (ICAEE), Dhaka, Bangladesh, 28–30 September 2017; pp. 482–487.
29. Ferrag, M.A.; Maglaras, L.; Janicke, H.; Smith, R. Deep learning techniques for cyber security intrusion detection: A detailed
analysis. In Proceedings of the 6th International Symposium for ICS & SCADA Cyber Security Research, Athens, Greece, 10–12
September 2019; pp. 126–136.
30. Almseidin, M.; Alzubi, M.; Kovacs, S.; Alkasassbeh, M. Evaluation of machine learning algorithms for intrusion detection system.
In Proceedings of the 2017 IEEE 15th International Symposium on Intelligent Systems and Informatics (SISY), Subotica, Serbia
Serbia, 14–16 September 2017; pp. 277–282.
31. Aldwairi, T.; Perera, D.; Novotny, M.A. An evaluation of the performance of Restricted Boltzmann Machines as a model for
anomaly network intrusion detection. Comput. Netw. 2018, 144, 111–119.
32. Anwar, S.; Mohamad Zain, J.; Zolkipli, M.F.; Inayat, Z.; Khan, S.; Anthony, B.; Chang, V. From intrusion detection to an intrusion
response system: fundamentals, requirements, and future directions. Algorithms 2017, 10, 39.
33. Bhavsar, V.; Kadlak, A.; Sharma, S. Study on phishing attacks. Int. J. Comput. Appl. 2018, 182, 27–29.
34. Radoglou-Grammatikis, P.I.; Sarigiannidis, P.G. An anomaly-based intrusion detection system for the smart grid based on cart
decision tree. In Proceedings of the 2018 Global Information Infrastructure and Networking Symposium (GIIS), Thessaloniki,
Greece, 23–25 October 2018; pp. 1–5.
35. Kiranyaz, S.; Avci, O.; Abdeljaber, O.; Ince, T.; Gabbouj, M.; Inman, D.J. 1D convolutional neural networks and applications: A
survey. Mech. Syst. Signal Process. 2021, 151, 107398.
36. Stewart, B.; Rosa, L.; Maglaras, L.; Cruz, T.J.; Simões, P.; Janicke, H. Effect of network architecture changes on ocsvm based
intrusion detection system. In Proceedings of the International Conference on Industrial Networks and Intelligent Systems,
Hanoi, Vietnam,27–28 August 2016; Springer: Berlin/Heidelberg, Germany, 2016, pp. 90–100.
